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One striking aspect of the twentieth century is the rise of a number of orga-
nizationally and geographically distinct spaces—cities, factories, house-
holds, hospitals, harbors, supermarkets, airports, offices, to name some of
them—as important sites for technology development. As the century pro-
gressed, the number of different technologies in simultaneous use in these
spaces increased. This collocation of technologies encouraged various
actors to develop mechanisms and arrangements by which they could coor-
dinate the interaction of these technologies. Typically these actors also
developed mediating technologies that facilitated and stimulated the inter-
action of different technologies.
A number of scholars have reflected on the management activities
required to deal with the complex interactions of collocated technologies.
Joel Tarr and Gabriel Dupuy have shown how, at the end of the nineteenth
century, as the growth of Western cities spawned serious logistical chal-
lenges concerning energy and water supplies, waste handling, transporta-
tion, and communications, municipal bureaucrats responded by beginning
to coordinate and plan the layout of urban areas.1 Lindy Biggs has pre-
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sented a picture of a new kind of industrial engineer starting to systemati-
cally plan the physical design of factories and develop assembly lines and
conveyors to handle the flow of materials between machines and work sta-
tions in the factory.2 In fact, the concepts of “urban technology” and “fac-
tory technology” gained currency by the increased collocation of technolo-
gies at specific sites. As the city and factory shaped technologies, so in turn
did technologies shape the city and the factory.
In this article we analyze the collocation of technologies and the result-
ant patterns of development created in a specific site: the office. For this
purpose we advance the concept of the “innovation junction,” which we
define as a space in which different sets of heterogeneous technologies are
mobilized in support of social and economic activities and in which, as a
result of their collocation, interactions and exchanges among these tech-
nologies occur. These interactions and exchanges lead to location-specific
innovation patterns. The problems posed and opportunities offered by the
collocation and interaction of different sets of technologies in bounded
spaces create a need for coordination. This need is defined not only by users
themselves (companies, managers, employees) but also by a new type of
intermediate actor positioned between producers and users of technolo-
gies, working and reflecting on their interaction. Like the city and the fac-
tory, the office became the subject of intense analysis and intervention by
these reflexive actors. Two forms of interaction among artifacts resulted as
well: the combined use of two or more technologies and the extension of
the functional characteristics of technologies, including the transfer of
functional characteristics from one technology to another.
Innovation junctions are not exclusively twentieth-century phenom-
ena; many factory and harbor technologies (to name only two possibilities)
were applied concurrently in earlier eras. However, in the twentieth century
innovation junctions became increasingly important to the development of
technology and society. Their impact on twentieth-century society is com-
parable to that of large, geographically dispersed, infrastructural systems,
such as electrical grids, communication networks, and transportation sys-
tems.3 They led to the emergence of a new range of infrastructures, prod-
2. Lindy Biggs, “The Engineered Factory,” Technology and Culture 36, suppl. (1995):
S174–88; The Rational Factory: Architecture, Technology and Work in America’s Age of
Mass Production (Baltimore, 1996).
3. On large technical systems, see Renate Mayntz and Thomas P. Hughes, eds., The
Development of Large Technical Systems (Frankfurt am Main and Boulder, Colo., 1988);
Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthu-
siasm (New York, 1989); Todd R. La Porte, ed., Social Responses to Large Technical Systems
(Dordrecht and Boston, 1991); Renate Mayntz, “Grosse technische Systeme und ihre
gesellschaftstheoretische Bedeutung,” Kölner Zeitschrift für Sociologie und Socialpsychol-
ogie 45 (1993): 97–108; Jane Summerton, ed., Changing Large Technical Systems (Boul-
der, Colo., 1994); M. Karlsson and L. Sturesson, eds., The World’s Largest Machine: Global
Telecommunications and the Human Condition (Stockholm, 1995); Arne Kaijser and
Marika Hedin, eds., Nordic Energy Systems: Historical Perspectives and Current Issues
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ucts, activities, services, and industries, and to new sets of user patterns and
identities. However, innovation junctions differ in fundamental ways from
the infrastructure-based systems that have been studied using the large
technical systems perspective inspired by Thomas Hughes’s classic Net-
works of Power.4 Hughes’s study offers a generalized model of the process of
large system development, arguing that a number of characteristic phases
in that development can be distinguished: invention, development and
innovation, transfer, growth, and momentum. During each phase specific
groups are foregrounded—engineers-entrepreneurs, manager-entrepre-
neurs, and finally financier-entrepreneurs—to produce solutions to the
problems encountered in building the system. In addition, in Hughes’s
model system development proceeds through a number of mechanisms:
attention to a favorable load factor and economic mix, identification of
reverse salients, and the creation of momentum.
Although understanding the mechanisms of systems development may
be important for understanding the development of innovation junctions,
the Hughesian framework is not appropriate for analyzing them. The main
reason for this is that the change dynamics of innovation junctions are not
determined by the process of creating and sustaining geographically dis-
persed, material infrastructures. Instead, technology development at inno-
vation junctions takes place by dealing with the challenge posed by the exis-
tence of different sets of technologies at one location. Whereas large
technical systems derive their dynamics from geographical expansion,
innovation junctions derive their dynamics from collocation in specific
spaces.5 Their local and spatial base also distinguishes innovation junctions
from second-order large technical systems. The concept of second-order
large technical systems has recently been introduced as a necessary com-
plement to the first-order large technical systems analyzed by Hughes.6
Second-order large technical systems such as, for instance, postal systems or
organ transplant systems, are built on top of first-order large technical sys-
tems, combining and utilizing elements of them. In this sense, second-
order large technical systems are similar to innovation junctions, which
also incorporate different sets of technologies. However, in contrast to
innovation junctions, second-order technical systems are highly dispersed.
As a result, they do not foster a location-based interaction and exchange
among sets of technologies. Also, although first and second-order large
technical systems contain sites of technology development, these are loosely
(Canton, Mass., 1995); Olivier Coutard, ed., The Governance of Large Technical Systems
(New York, 1999).
4. Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880–
1930 (Baltimore, 1988).
5. This, of course, does not mean that innovation junctions do not expand.
6. Ingo Braun and Bernward Joerges, “How to Reconcile Large Technical Systems:
The Case of European Organ Transplantation,” in Summerton, 25–51.
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or tightly coupled through large-scale infrastructural networks. Thus, air-
ports and harbors can be viewed as hierarchically connected sites within
larger systems of transportation. Factories, households, and offices, in con-
trast, are far less systematically coupled, although they too are part of com-
mon sociotechnical networks.7
Ruth Schwartz Cowan has pointed to the importance of user location
in explaining technological development. In her view, to understand tech-
nical change, and especially diffusion, one needs to identify the consump-
tion-production networks (ranging from producers through intermediate
actors to final consumers) and to view those networks in which new tech-
nologies are produced from the consumer’s point of view.8 Cowan defines
the household as “the consumption junction, the place and the time at
which the consumer makes choices between competing technologies.”9 The
way we address junctions is inspired by her concept, especially her empha-
sis on users, but differs from it in a fundamental way. We will emphasize
innovation patterns that result from the combined use of different tech-
nologies and the transfer of functional characteristics between technolo-
gies. Cowan’s analysis is restricted to competing technologies and con-
sumer choices, while our focus is on problems and opportunities raised by
the collocation of a number of technologies.10
7. Braun and Joerges refer to firms and households as the opposite ends of the con-
tinuum of large technical systems, with second-order systems positioned halfway
between these two poles; Braun and Joerges, 44–45.
8. Ruth Schwartz Cowan, “The Consumption Junction: A Proposal for Research
Strategies in the Sociology of Technology,” in The Social Construction of Technological
Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, ed. Wiebe E. Bijker,
Trevor Pinch, and Thomas P. Hughes (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), 261–80. See also Thom-
as J. Misa, A Nation of Steel: The Making of Modern America, 1865-1925 (Baltimore,
1995); Misa argues convincingly that innovation in steel manufacturing can only be
understood by focusing on changing user-producer relationships.
9. Cowan, 263.
10. The issue of the interaction of technologies has been addressed from different
viewpoints. Economic historians such as Nathan Rosenberg have pointed to the impor-
tance of interdependencies or complementarities among different technologies in
explaining economic growth; see “Technological Interdependence in the American
Economy,” Technology and Culture 20 (1979): 25–50. Space has become an important
concept in economics, especially as it contributes to understanding why innovations
(defined as successfully introduced new products) are often clustered. Such a clustering
delivers competitive advantages through spillovers, learning effects, informal informa-
tion sharing, and scale effects. See Peter Hall, Cities in Civilization (New York, 1998),
291–500. See also John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, The Social Life of Information
(Boston, 2000); using the example of Silicon Valley, they argue that space remains
meaningful in the age of globalization and expanding information flows. Francesca
Bray, in Technology and Gender: Fabrics of Power in Late Imperial China (Berkeley and
Los Angeles, 1997), has stressed the importance of studying different sets of technolo-
gies simultaneously. To understand the construction of gender, the relations between
people, and the lack of overt change in China, Bray analyzed various technolo-
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The Office as Innovation Junction
Our focus here is the development of the office in the Netherlands
between 1880 and 1980, roughly the period between the introduction of the
typewriter and the introduction of the personal computer. Since the kind of
interactions we were looking for took place on the leading edge of office
technology development and were therefore first implemented in larger
offices, we have left smaller offices out of our analysis. New research will
have to establish whether the technology dynamics identified in this article
also hold true for smaller offices, offices outside the Netherlands, and other
kinds of innovation junctions.11 Our focus is not so much on what actually
went on in the office—at the shop-floor level, so to speak—as on the design
of the processes of interaction. Accordingly, we have primarily studied the
actors responsible for decisions concerning the procurement and applica-
tion of office technology.12 We will draw mainly on case material from a
number of Dutch companies in the service sector and in trade and industry,
and on sales literature from office machine producers and importers.
The office as a distinct domain started to emerge in the Netherlands in
the second half of the nineteenth century. At about the same time, copying
presses and hectographs were introduced to supplement the traditional pen
and paper. Large offices appeared at the end of the nineteenth century and
continued to grow during the first decades of the twentieth century. A host
of new technologies surfaced, among them typewriters; accounting, book-
keeping, stencil, and addressing machines; and punched-card installations.
In the 1920s and 1930s, offices with over a thousand employees and sub-
stantially mechanized administrative operations were not unusual.13
Computers followed in the 1950s. These technologies were employed in the
performance of a number of different activities, ranging from the produc-
tion, copying, storage, and transmission of documents to bookkeeping and
accounting to administrative data processing. Since all were used in the
same location and for more or less interconnected tasks, they had to be
geared to each other to an increasing extent and so became, in various ways,
more and more interdependent.
gies that provide overlapping contexts for the processes of social construction. We share
Bray’s desire to leave single-technology case studies behind and her focus on incorpo-
rating a spatial dimension in the history of technology, but we add an emphasis on ana-
lyzing the shaping role of collocation of various technologies, which cannot be found in
her work.
11. This research is well underway as part of the Dutch national research project on
the history of technology in the twentieth century.
12. This choice, of course, resembles Hughes’s focus on system builders.
13. Onno de Wit and Jan van den Ende, “The Emergence of a New Regime: Business
Management and Office Mechanization in the Dutch Financial Sector in the 1920s,”
Business History 42 (April 2000): 87–118.
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The existing literature on the history of the office and the history of
office technologies can be roughly divided into three main categories. One
category describes and analyzes the development of office technology in the
context of changing labor and gender relationships.14 Another focuses on
specific user locations at which specific technologies, such as punched-card
machines or computers, were introduced and applied.15 A third considers
the design of office machines and technologies at the level of specific arti-
facts.16 Generally speaking, this literature as a whole does not systematically
analyze the processes of interaction inside the office either at the level of the
dynamics of office technologies or at the level of the actors involved. One
notable and inspiring exception is JoAnne Yates, whose Control through
Communication offers on the one hand historical overviews of several early
office technologies and on the other case histories of the ways in which
internal communication processes were transformed at several major
American companies.17 However, in contrast to the approach taken in this
article, Yates does not conceptualize these interaction processes inside the
office, and limits her analysis to text production, copying, and filing.
14. See, for example, Alan Delgado, The Enormous File: A Social History of the Office
(London, 1979); Margery W. Davies, Woman’s Place Is at the Typewriter: Office Work and
Office Workers, 1870–1930 (Philadelphia, 1982); Joli Jensen, “Using the Typewriter:
Secretaries, Reporters and Authors, 1880–1930,” Technology in Society 10 (1988): 255–66;
Sharon Hartman Strom, Beyond the Typewriter: Gender, Class, and the Origins of Modern
Office Work, 1900–1930 (Urbana, Ill., 1992); Angel Kowlek-Folland, Engendering Busi-
ness: Men and Women in the Corporate Office, 1870–1930 (Baltimore, 1994); Francisca de
Haan, Gender and the Politics of Office Work: The Netherlands, 1860–1940 (Amsterdam,
1998).
15. Arthur L. Norberg, “High-Technology Calculation in the Early 20th Century:
Punched-Card Machinery in Business and Government,” Technology and Culture 31
(October 1990): 753–79; Martin Campbell-Kelly, “Large-Scale Data Processing in the
Prudential, 1850–1930,” Accounting, Business and Financial History 1 (1992): 117–39;
JoAnne Yates,“Co-evolution of Information-Processing Technology and Use: Interaction
between the Life Insurance and Tabulating Industries,” Business History Review 67
(spring 1993): 1–51; Martin Campbell-Kelly,“The Railway Clearing House and Victorian
Data Processing,” in Information Acumen: The Understanding and Use of Knowledge in
Modern Business, ed. Lisa Bud-Frierman (London, 1994), 51–74; Martin Campbell-Kelly,
“Data Processing and Technological Change: The Post Office Savings Bank, 1861–1930,”
Technology and Culture 39 (1998): 1–32.
16. Stan Augarten, Bit by Bit: An Illustrated History of Computers (New York, 1984);
Adrian Forty, Objects of Desire: Design and Society, 1750–1980 (London, 1986); Andreas
Knie, “‘Generierung’ und ‘Härtung’ technischen Wissens: Die Entstehung der mechanis-
chen Schreibmaschine,” Technikgeschichte 58 (1991): 101–26; Rodney Dale and Rebecca
Weaver, Machines in the Office (London, 1993); Ellen Lupton, Mechanical Brides: Women
and Machines from Home to Office (New York, 1993); Charles W. Wootton and Carel M.
Wolk, “The Evolution and Acceptance of the Loose-Leaf Accounting System, 1885–
1935,” Technology and Culture 41 (2000): 80–98.
17. JoAnne Yates, Control through Communication: The Rise of System in American
Management (Baltimore, 1989).
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This article discerns three phases in the history of the office, each char-
acterized by specific patterns of interaction between office machines and
producers, users, and intermediary actors. We will discuss each of these
periods in turn before proceeding finally to an analysis of the patterns that
resulted from those interactions and a discussion of how they differ from
the dynamics of large technical systems.
New Office Machines, 1880–1914
Between 1880 and 1914, the development of new management prac-
tices, the rise of large firms, and the establishment of new government
requirements spurred demand by owners and managers of companies for
new methods of bookkeeping and cost accounting.18 Several new technolo-
gies accompanied the new office methods, and among these the typewriter
was of central importance. The American Remington Typewriter Company
began selling typewriters in Europe, including the Netherlands, in the early
1880s, and the trading company Fred. Stieltjes and Company became Rem-
ington’s Dutch sales representative in about 1883.19 By shortly after the turn
of the century, one major office equipment company, Blikman and Sartor-
ius, was selling almost two hundred typewriters a year.20
Available data suggest that in the Netherlands as elsewhere the first
users of the typewriter were predominantly top male managers.21 However,
the typewriter was very soon transferred to the domain of male or female
secretaries, who combined typewriting with dictation, shorthand, and tele-
phone work.22 Because the typewriter speeded up the process of text pro-
duction, managers gradually separated the conceptualization and writing
of text.23 Innovations that were introduced almost simultaneously with the
typewriter, such as the dictating machine and various shorthand writing
18. Jan A. de Jonge, De industrialisatie in Nederland tussen 1850 en 1914 (Nijmegen,
1976), 234–36; Jan Luiten van Zanden, ed., The Economic Development of the Netherlands
since 1870 (Cheltenham, 1996).
19. Circular letter of Fred. Stieltjes and Company and accompanying testimonials of
Remington typewriter users, 18 April 1890, Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, bibliotheek,
N.42.175.18, nos. 2 and 3.
20. Cornelia C. van de Graft, Lotgevallen van een Amsterdams koopmanshuis 1749–
1949 (Amsterdam, 1949), 208.
21. Jensen (n. 14 above); Strom (n. 14 above), 48–49, 62, 177; Francisca de Haan,
Sekse op kantoor: Over vrouwelijkheid, mannelijkheid en macht, Nederland 1860–1940
(Hilversum, 1992), 141–50.
22. Although the decision concerning the purchase of a typewriter undoubtedly was
the office manager’s, at some companies that already used one or more typewriters
employees insisted upon the purchase of additional machines; B. P. A. Gales, Werken aan
zekerheid: Een terugblik over de schouder van AEGON op twee eeuwen verzkerings-
geschiedenis (The Hague, 1986), 178.
23. Yates, Control through Communication (n. 17 above), 39–45.
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techniques, enabled this separation.24 Typewriter agencies capitalized on
this development by combining typewriter courses with courses in short-
hand writing.25
Typewriting also came to be linked to the reproduction of texts and
documents. Before the introduction of the typewriter, the production and
copying of a text were two separate activities: after the text was written, it
was copied with the help of a copying press or hectograph. With the inven-
tion of carbon paper suitable for typewriters, it became possible to com-
bine writing with copying.26 At the turn of the century, almost all Dutch
typewriter ads promoted this possibility.27 With carbon paper, up to twenty
copies of a letter or invoice could be made.28 Also, typewriting was com-
patible with a new copying technology introduced during the 1890s, sten-
cil duplicating. Although cyclostyles or mimeographs, as stencil duplicators
were called in the United States, at first were used to make copies of hand-
written texts, after the introduction of the typewriter stencil paper was
developed that was suitable for making typewritten stencils. A 1904 adver-
tisement claimed that the combination of the mimeograph and the
National typewriter could produce as many as two thousand readable
copies.29
The increased mechanization of the office not only affected the pro-
duction and reproduction of letters and documents, it also influenced their
filing and storage. The introduction of typewriters and carbon paper pro-
voked the introduction of alternatives to the bound ledger. Duplication of
current account notes, for example, became unnecessary if a loose-leaf cur-
rent account book was used in combination with the typewriter and car-
bon paper. Files or ledgers consisting of loose leaves also made it feasible to
arrange documents thematically instead of in the traditional chronological
scheme. In some instances, the relationship between typewriter and file sys-
tems was reversed: at a number of insurance companies and registry offices
24. On the invention of the dictaphone, see Edward J. Pershey, “Drawing as a Means
to Inventing: Edison and the Invention of the Phonograph,” in Working at Invention:
Thomas A. Edison and the Menlo Park Experience, ed. William S. Pretzer (Dearborn,
Mich., 1989), 100–115; Mark Clark, “Suppressing Innovation: Bell Telephone and
Magnetic Recording,” Technology and Culture 34 (1993): 521–37; David Morton, Off the
Record: The Technology and Culture of Sound Recording in America (New Brunswick, N.J.,
2000).
25. De Haan, Sekse op kantoor, 45, 139.
26. Yates, Control through Communication, 46–50.
27. Various advertisements, catalogues and price-lists of typewriter companies,
Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, bibliotheek, N.41.151.28-36 and N.42.175.10-18.
28. Circular letter, Amsterdam Bar-Lock Company, circa 1905, Gemeentearchief
Amsterdam, bibliotheek, N.41.151.29, no. 1. In practice, the number of readable copies
that could be made was probably less than ten.
29. Circular letter, Lutkie & Smit, Amsterdam, August 1904, Gemeentearchief
Amsterdam, bibliotheek, N.42.175.11, no. 5.
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(local census bureaus), new card systems stimulated the introduction of
typewriters.30
Thus, although new office technologies were not necessarily introduced
simultaneously at individual companies, the presence of the typewriter
made it much more likely that changes in duplicating methods and file sys-
tems would soon follow. The typewriter became the center of a new admin-
istrative organization in which the technologies employed in producing,
reproducing, and storing documents were increasingly linked. Although
these technologies were discrete in principal, several forms of interaction
emerged during this period at local offices and out of local initiatives. Sales
agents and importers of office technologies in turn picked up on these
interactions, pointing to the efficiencies created by the combined use of
new technologies to reinforce their sales efforts.
System Machines and Efficiency Experts, 1914–1955
In the 1910s, accountants, efficiency experts, business managers, senior
public servants, management consultants, and psychologists hotly debated
new ideas of systematic and scientific management emanating from the
United States. They argued for rationalized and more efficient procedures
and management in a wide range of municipal, national, and industrial
companies and service sectors. Through the implementation of office tech-
nologies and the systematic analysis of information flows and work proce-
dures, managers and outside consultants also sought to optimize the mon-
itoring and control of administrative activities and financial operations.31
In the 1920s, their individual activities became institutionalized as part of
a broader efficiency movement. Members of this movement increasingly
directed their attention to office management and administrative work
procedures, as opposed to production. Several consulting firms and insti-
tutions were established that came to mediate between the producers and
importers of office machines on the one hand and the users of these office
machines on the other.
In 1922, the Dutch Mechanical Administrative Office Organization
(Mechanisch-Administratieve Bedrijfs Organisatie, MABO) came into
being, founded by a number of employees from the Amsterdam headquar-
ters of the Rotterdamsche Bank who sought to commercially exploit the
various reorganization and mechanization measures that they had been
developing since 1917.32 This was not the first Dutch organizational con-
30. Gemeentearchief Utrecht, Secretariearchief VI 11318, overzicht jan. 1929 van bij
gemeentelijke afdelingen en diensten in gebruik zijnde type- en kantoormachines; Gales
(n. 22 above), 178–79.
31. De Wit and Van den Ende, “The Emergence of a New Regime” (n. 13 above).
32. For the history of the MABO, see Commissie Tak, Rapport over de oorzaken van 
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sultancy, but it was the first to concentrate exclusively on administration
and office technology.33 Partly in competition with the private MABO,
beginning in about 1928 the Governmental Office Machine Center (Rijk-
skantoormachinecentrale, or KMC) started advising government depart-
ments on the purchase of office machines. One of the tasks given to the
KMC was to assess the ways in which new office machines fitted into the
existing office organization.34
Of the many organizations and institutions founded in the 1920s to pro-
mote efficiency in businesses and households, the Dutch Institute for
Efficiency (Nederlands Instituut voor Efficiency, NIVE) was undoubtedly
among the most important.35 Founded in 1925, it established various “man-
agement research groups” that studied administrative methods and office
machines, visited companies, and set up inquiries into the diffusion of office
technologies. Beginning in 1927, the Research Group for Modern Office
Technology (Studiekring voor Moderne Kantoortechniek, STUMOKA) also
served as an important medium for transferring experience with office
technology from one company to another. Members included a number of
large banks, insurance companies, public utilities, and industrial companies.
In 1930 STUMOKA officially became part of NIVE.36
The ad hoc implementation of office machinery during the years before
World War I thus gave way to a much more systematic and professional
approach. Whereas between 1880 and 1914 companies had simply experi-
mented with new technologies, sometimes in cooperation with sales agents
and importers, they now could turn for advice to management consulting
firms and other intermediary organizations focused exclusively on ration-
alizing administrative activities and introducing office equipment. Office
machinery was subsumed in a larger concern for efficiency, reorganization,
and control.
The emergence of these intermediary organizations was closely related
to technological developments. Most of the office machines that had been
introduced during the previous phase now underwent a broad process of
de ontwrichting en van de verergerde ontwrichting van den Postcheque- en Girodienst en de
schuldigen daaraan (The Hague, 1924).
33. Peter Hellema and Joop Marsman, De organisatie-adviseur: Opkomst en groei van
een nieuw vak in Nederland 1920–1960 (Amsterdam, 1997).
34. Jan van Oorschot, “De ontwikkeling van de kantoormachines en de taak van de
Rijkskantoormachinecentrale,” Informatie 20 (1978): 718–24.
35. Peter Zwaal, Een gemene zaak: Efficiency-ingenieurs, accountants en psychotech-
nici & en het Nederlandsch Instituut voor Efficiency als presentatieplatform van scientific
management 1925–1940 (Rotterdam, 1991); Erik S. A. Bloemen, Scientific management
in Nederland 1900–1930 (Amsterdam, 1988), 165–81; Cita Hartveld, Moderne zake-
lijkheid: Efficiency in wonen en werken in Nederland 1918–1940 (Amsterdam, 1994),
216–34.
36. A. M. J. Kruissink, Een en ander over de “STUMOKA” (Purmerend, 1931).
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diffusion. Typewriters became common in the Dutch office, although cer-
tain types of offices, such as municipal registries, lagged behind. A 1926
handbook on office machines mentioned no fewer than twenty different
brands of typewriters. Its author rightly remarked that companies without
typewriters had become almost unthinkable.37
Beginning about 1914, as the typewriter and counting and adding
devices became broadly diffused in the Netherlands, various multifunc-
tional office machines appeared that could perform simultaneously a num-
ber of previously separate administrative activities. Examples of these “sys-
tem machines,” as they came to be called in the 1950s, include typewriting
cash registers and typewriting counting machines as well as bookkeeping,
punched-card, and addressing machines.38 As the number and complexity
of office machines increased, the demand for advice, instruction, and infor-
mation also rose. This demand was still met in part by the importers and
suppliers of office machines. In fact, during this period they institutional-
ized and professionalized their instructional activities.39 But management
consulting firms increasingly came to meet the demand for information on
how office machinery and reorganization could be used to optimize
administrative processes.
Addressing machines, introduced in the Netherlands just before World
War I, undoubtedly became the most versatile system machines. Basically,
these consisted of a punching device or typewriter that stamped addresses
into metal or stencil sheets that were then linked together on a mimeograph
machine. Companies that periodically had to send letters to large numbers
of clients were the first purchasers, but beginning in the 1920s addressing
machines came increasingly to be used for broader administrative pur-
poses, such as producing lists of client data or printing names and ad-
dresses on invoices, bills, tickets, patients’ identity discs, and notices. To
make all this possible, addressing machines were fitted with mechanisms
that supported list management and selection, printing, and tabulating.
Because of their increased multifunctionality, it became easier to link
addressing machines to other office machines, such as bookkeeping and
punched-card machines. The practice at the Dutch central circulation
bank, the Nederlandsche Bank, which was one of the first firms to purchase
an addressing machine, offers an example. The printed lists produced by
the bank’s punched-card installation were cut into standard sizes in letter
37. R. G. ter Haak, Kantoormachines en administratiesystemen: Een beschrijving van
moderne hulpmiddelen ten dienste van de administratie (Amsterdam, 1927), 278–304.
38. A. Meeuwis, Hulpmiddelen der administratieve techniek (The Hague, 1959), 3–4.
39. In 1919, the Dutch Association of Stationers (Nederlandsche Vereeniging van
Kantoorboekhandelaren, NEVEKA) founded its own monthly magazine, and the Assoc-
iation of Importers and Producers of Office Machines (Vereeniging van Importeurs en
Fabrikanten van Kantoormachines, VIFKA) regularly organized exhibitions on office
efficiency from 1924 onward.
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format. An Adressograph and a signature machine, the Graphotyp, then
processed the lists into bills to be sent to the bank’s clients.40
Increasing multifunctionality also allowed addressing machines to be
developed into “organization systems,” a term first used in the 1920s and
1930s by the Andrema Company, an early manufacturer. The term was
intended to differentiate between machines used for ordinary addressing
work and more complex models around which the entire administrative
process could be organized.41 In some companies addressing machines
became the central building blocks of the administrative organization. In
the 1930s, for instance, local Dutch health insurance companies used
punched identity discs for patients’ forms, doctors’ and pharmacists’ cards,
and internal administration registers. This application of addressing
machine technology was codeveloped by the insurance companies and the
supplier of the Andrema addressing machine, H. A. Kramers & Zoon.42
Similarly, in 1920 a number of health insurance companies went to Kram-
ers & Zoon looking for an addressing machine that could print lists itself;
the company began development, and the new machine was patented by
Andrema in 1923.43
Punched-card devices also became important system machines. Her-
man Hollerith had developed these machines at the end of the nineteenth
century in the United States for statistical applications, and they were first
used on a wide scale in the 1890 United States census.44 In Hollerith’s sys-
tem, clerks used keypunches to record data onto cards that were subse-
quently processed by sorting and tabulating machines. Punching, sorting,
and tabulating machines could not operate independently, and in fact
worked in close conjunction with each other. In addition to the Hollerith
Company, which in the 1910s became part of the Computing-Tabulating-
Recording Corporation (CTR), the Accounting Machine Company, estab-
lished in 1911 by James Power, became an important manufacturer of
punched-card machines. These two companies competed for the American
and European markets, and both set up local Dutch agencies around 1920.45
Punched-card machines were introduced into the Netherlands in 1916,
by the Dutch Central Statistical Office (CBS), which used the Hollerith
40. Jozef L. de Jager, De bank van de gulden: Organisatie en personeel van De Neder-
landsche Bank 1814–1989 (Amsterdam, 1989), 95, 121.
41. Joan I. W. Klaassen,“Adresseermachines: Ontwikkeling en gebruik van adresseer-
machines in de administratie” (graduation thesis, Technical University Eindhoven,
1994), 56–57.
42. Klaassen, 70–75.
43. Klaassen, 41.
44. On punched-card technology, see Martin Campbell-Kelly, “Punched-Card
Machinery,” in Computing before Computers, ed. William Aspray (Ames, Iowa, 1990),
122–55; Norberg (n. 15 above).
45. James Connolly, “History of Computing in Europe,” unpublished report, IBM
World Trade Corp., 1968, 19–21.
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machines to calculate foreign trade statistics. The numbers were read off
from the tabulating machine and copied manually onto Burroughs adding
machines.46 In the 1920s the number and types of companies that deployed
punched-card machines had increased significantly.47 Among this new
group of users were insurance and industrial companies, municipal serv-
ices, state-owned enterprises, and banks. All had extensive administrative
operations, which justified the acquisition of the costly punched-card
equipment. The Rotterdamsche Bank was one of the main Dutch pioneers
in the application of punched-card technology, and came to serve as a
model for other large companies, in particular for the Dutch Giro Service
and the Dutch State Mines. Both companies reorganized administratively,
with the help of the former bank employees who in 1922 had established
the MABO, along the lines set up at the bank.48
At first the Rotterdamsche Bank’s punched-card installation was used
only in the bank’s giro transfer system: for every transfer a punched card was
made, and these cards were then sorted, tabulated, checked against the earlier
totals, and finally used in the making up of transfer notes. By 1921 some three
thousand transfers a day were being handled in this manner.49 In the years
that followed the number of Hollerith and Powers punched-card machines at
the Rotterdamsche Bank’s Amsterdam office increased significantly, as the
machines were deployed for an increasing variety of administrative pur-
poses.50 This became evident during a 1926 exhibition on office organization
and technology held in Amsterdam.51 The exhibit catalog showed that calcu-
lating, bookkeeping, and punched-card machines had become central to the
processing of all financial data, not just giro transactions. The bank was using
punched-card machines to make up daily balance sheets for central manage-
ment and to keep salary records, and the technology had been adopted in the
bank’s forwarding and postage department as well.52
The large-scale application of office machines at the Rotterdamsche
Bank was accompanied by a systematic analysis of administrative processes
46. Jan van den Ende, Knopen, kaarten en chips: De geschiedenis van de automatiser-
ing bij het Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (Voorburg and Heerlen, 1991), 2–28.
47. Connolly, 20, E-3/7.
48. The transfer of ideas and punched-card technology from the Rotterdamsche
Bank to other companies is dealt with in De Wit and Van den Ende, “The Emergence of
a New Regime” (n. 13 above).
49. ABN AMRO, Historical Archive, Amsterdam, Archive Rotterdamsche Bank, no.
109, verslag vergadering Raad van Commissarissen, 16 November 1921.
50. From about 1920 onward, the bank used both Hollerith and Powers machinery.
In 1925 and 1930 more Hollerith punched-card machinery was ordered; Archive
Rotterdamsche Bank, no. 94, stukken betreffende The Tabulating Machine Company.
51. De tentoonstelling op het gebied van de openbare en particuliere bedrijfsadminis-
tratie T.O.P.A. 1926, 3 vols. (Purmerend, 1926–27).
52. Sam Roet, “Moderne expeditie- en portiadministratie,” Administratieve Arbeid
(1924), 84–92; H. Fedder, “Personeels-Administratie,” Administratieve Arbeid (1927),
186–90.
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53. At the Dutch Central Statistical Bureau in 1937, for example, outside consultants
analyzed the flow of forms and punched cards in the Trade Statistics Department,
through different units using machinery that included sorting devices, punchers,
punched-card sorters, tabulators, calculating machines, typewriters, archival devices.
Van den Ende, Knopen, kaarten en chips (n. 46 above), 49–52.
54. Yates, “Co-evolution of Information-Processing Technology and Use” (n. 15
above); Campbell-Kelly, “Punched-Card Machinery” (n. 44 above), 142; De tentoon-
stelling op het gebied van de openbare en particuliere bedrijfsadministratie, 2:310–32; R. G.
ter Haak, “Powers en haar nieuwe vindingen,” Administratieve Arbeid (1931), 287–320,
345–66.
55. Ter Haak, “Powers en haar nieuwe vindingen”; M. C. Winterstein, “De alfabetis-
che Hollerith-Tabelleermachine,” Administratieve Arbeid (1932), 32–34. See also James
W. Cortada, Before the Computer: IBM, NCR, Burroughs, and Remington Rand and the
Industry They Created, 1865–1956 (Princeton, N.J., 1993), 106–9.
56. Catalogus “Efficiency” Tentoonstelling van moderne hulpmiddelen voor fabrieks- en
kantooradministratie van 18 tot en met 27 maart 1926 (Amsterdam, 1926); Administra-
tieve Arbeid (1926), 106–7.
57. C. W. Wintersteijn, Banken, hare boekhouding en organisatie, vol. 1 (Leiden,
1932), 50–53.
aimed at optimizing them to suit information flows within the bank and
identifying strategic points at which machines could be used to speed up
work processes. Such analyses were common.53 In the meantime, a number
of innovations in the 1920s and 1930s allowed punched-card technology,
which had until then been used primarily for statistical applications, to be
adapted to bookkeeping and even more general administrative tasks.
Improvements in methods of adding, subtracting, and multiplying helped
to speed up statistical calculations and made it possible to perform more
complex types of calculations. Tabulators were introduced that could print
alphabetical characters in addition to numbers, an important innovation
because it allowed names and addresses to be printed as well as numerical
data, thus greatly enhancing the amount of information that could be pro-
vided in list form or in other sorts of documents.54
Both printing and alphabetical capability were innovations pioneered by
the Powers’ Accounting Machine Company. Powers produced an alphabeti-
cal tabulating machine as early as 1924, some seven or eight years before its
rival CTR (which in 1924 changed its name to the International Business
Machines Corporation) came up with a similar device.55 The Powers alpha-
betical tabulator was introduced in the Netherlands in 1926.56 It was quickly
adopted by the Rotterdamsche Bank and by some of the other big Dutch
banks for their securities administration. In 1932, the Twentsche Bank
became the first European company to use an IBM alphabetical tabulator.57
Not all of the technical innovations in punched-card technology came
from outside the Netherlands. At the Rotterdamsche Bank, Jan Stuivenberg,
who had been involved in the design and application of punched-card
machinery as early as 1920, played an important role in the successful adap-
tation of punched-card technology. Stuivenberg introduced several
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58. Connolly (n. 45 above), 20.
59. Meeuwis (n. 38 above), 198–218; Studiegroep Industrie Den Haag, Adminis-
tratieve techniek (The Hague, 1954).
60. Modern Kantoor, July–August 1958, 121; VIFKA Archive, Woerden, files Efficien-
cy Exhibitions 1959-1970, Efficiency Beurs 1960.
61. D. Pietersma, “Enkele kleine integratiehulpmiddelen in de administratie,” in
Omschakeling naar automatie: Enkele bijdragen over de ontwikkeling naar automatische
informatieverwerking, ed. N. V. Philips (Eindhoven, 1960), 10.0–6.
62. A. Meeuwis, “Aanpak van automatie in de administratie,” in Philips, 2.0–11. The
telex service of the Dutch Post, Telegraph and Telephone Administration was using
punched paper tape as a transmission medium by the early 1950s.
improvements to the bank’s Hollerith and Powers machinery, including an
automatic paper feeder for the Powers tabulator.58
Especially after the Second World War, producers and users of type-
writers and system machines such as addressing machines and punched-
card machines began to devote increasing attention to methods of exchang-
ing information among them. Devices were developed that aimed at
optimizing the transfer of data between typewriters and system machines.
In all cases, punched cards and punched paper tapes served as interfaces.
The Flexowriter, for instance, was an electric typewriter with an additional
perforator that automatically transferred written text onto punched paper
tapes. The tape could be used to operate the card punch of an addressing
machine, or punched cards could be created from it using a tape-to-card
converter. The process worked the other way around as well; several
machines, including the Flexowriter, the Cardatype, and the Justowriter,
could process punched tapes or cards into written text.59
The Flexowriter and Justowriter came onto the market in the beginning
of the 1950s.60 One of the companies that developed such devices in the
Netherlands was the Philips Electronics Company. Stock movements were
registered and billed by a small bookkeeping machine. Simultaneously, a
card punch connected to the bookkeeping machine produced a punched
card, which was subsequently processed by a tabulating machine. By con-
necting bookkeeping and punched card technology in this way, Philips
eliminated several intermediate operations. In 1955 the connecting device
was put into use (for Philips’ stock administration).61
Research into integration devices continued at Philips during the sec-
ond half of the 1950s as researchers studied methods of determining dif-
ferences between written and punched data and of converting punched
cards to punched paper tapes or vice versa. As more and more typewriters
and bookkeeping machines produced punched paper tapes the question of
which medium was most appropriate as an integration device, punched
cards or punched tapes, also arose. Because tapes were suitable for data
transmission and because the similarity between written and punched data
could more easily be checked in tapes, Philips settled on them.62
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To summarize, after about 1914 the introduction and application of
office machines grew more complex. The successful integration of system
machines into an administrative organization called for much closer coop-
eration between suppliers and users, who also frequently called on consult-
ing firms for advice about office technology. Sometimes these consulting
firms were users who sought to transfer their own experience with office
technology to other locations, emphasizing the interdependencies among
efficiency, new management styles, and office machines. Devices with dif-
ferent functions, such as text production and data processing, came
increasingly to be linked to each other: addressing machines were used in
combination with typewriters or punched-card machines, punched-card
machines in conjunction with calculating machines and printers. Both the
addressing machine and the punched-card machine developed from rather
simple technologies into complex data processing units, drawing together a
number of administrative activities—counting, sorting, writing, listing,
and the like—that had previously been separate. In addition to this func-
tional integration, punched cards and tapes developed into media for
transferring data between different office technologies. As a result, office
technology increasingly came to mean a chain of stand-alone devices inte-
grated by means of punched cards and punched tapes.
Integrated Data Processing, 1955–1980
From the mid-1950s on, the electronic computer gradually changed
the Dutch office landscape. Although the computer was developed for sci-
entific calculations, it did not take long for office equipment companies as
well as office managers and efficiency consultants to recognize its poten-
tial as a data processing technology in the office. The 1953 introduction by
IBM of the relatively small and cheap IBM 650 marked the definitive
breakthrough of computers in the office; an IBM 650 installed in 1957 by
the Dutch Land Cultivation Company (Nederlandse Heidemaatschappij)
was the first computer in the Netherlands specifically used for office
automation.63 Although the company had never been in the forefront of
office technology, its involvement in numerous postwar reconstruction
projects led to a dramatic and increasingly problematic growth in admin-
istrative operations.64
63. By 1968 almost a thousand computers had been installed in the Netherlands. The
Association of Importers and Producers of Office Machines estimated that eighty per-
cent of these were used for administrative purposes: R. J. Romein, “Computers in
Nederland,” Informatie 11 (1969): 316; Kantoor en Efficiency, September 1968, 4011. The
IBM 650 was called the Model T of computers; Rick Szostak, Technological Innovation
and the Great Depression (Boulder, Colo., 1995), 198.
64. Speech, H. J. A. Hendrikx, 28 March 1957, and annual reports, 1947–57, Rijk-
sarchief Gelderland, Arnhem, archief Heidemaatschappij, no. 538.
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65. Paul Ceruzzi, “Electronics Technology and Computer Science, 1940–1975: A
Coevolution,” Annals of the History of Computing 10 (1989): 261.
66. Paul Ceruzzi, “Crossing the Divide: Architectural Issues and the Emergence of
the Stored Program Computer, 1935–1955,” IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 19
(1997): 5–12.
67. Punched-card machines were programmed by wired switchboards that con-
nected the reading devices of the machines with tabulating and print mechanisms, as
opposed to putting abstract code into computer memory.
68. Paul N. Edwards, “Y2K: Millennial Reflections on Computers as Infrastructure,”
History and Technology 15 (1998): 7–29, at 13; Martin Campbell-Kelly and William
Aspray, Computer: A History of the Information Machine (New York, 1996), 105–30.
69. Ellen van Oost, “Administratieve automatisering,” in Techniek in Nederland in de
twintigste eeuw, ed. Johan Schot et al., vol. 1 (Zutphen, 1998), 326–27.
Technically, at the Heidemaatschappij and elsewhere, the computer was
a novelty. The first generation of computers employed vacuum tubes,
which had already been used in punched-card tabulating machines such as
the IBM 604, which had appeared on the market in 1948.65 The crucial dif-
ference between electromechanical punched-card machines and computers
lay in the fact that computers had internal processing units and memories
that could store not only data but also programs.66 This made the computer
much more programmable than punched-card machines. It also demanded
different programming techniques.67 Internal processors and random
access memory gave computers the capacity to perform long series of oper-
ations in a single step. As a result, the computer integrated functions (sort-
ing, collating, tabulating, and the like) for which punched-card installa-
tions needed different machines. Finally, computers were much faster than
punched-card machines. Despite the fact that early computers were expen-
sive, unreliable, and difficult to use, these new features were attractive
enough for several actors to invest in domesticating this promising tech-
nology into an efficient office machine.68 These actors embraced the com-
puter as a symbol of the modern office and as a forceful instrument of the
schematization and systematization of office work.69
A continuing intensive interaction among hardware suppliers, efficiency
engineers, office managers, and employees accompanied the implementa-
tion of the computer in the office. Despite this pattern of interaction, users
tended to become dependent upon the programming and systems knowl-
edge of hardware suppliers. Since the programming of first generation com-
puters was system dependent and programming techniques differed from
those of punched-card installations, office managers and efficiency engi-
neers could only partially rely on their earlier experiences. But managers and
engineers were uncomfortable with the dominant position that their lack of
knowledge gave hardware suppliers, and they responded by using existing
intermediary organizations, such as NIVE and STUMOKA, to exchange
knowledge and experience about office automation. In 1958 they established
a new institution, the Study Center for Administrative Automation (Sticht-
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ing Studiecentrum Administratieve Automatisering, SSAA). The SSAA,
through various working and research groups, played a pivotal role in the
development of office automation in the Netherlands until the mid-1970s.
It became the central forum for managers, management consultants, econ-
omists, engineers, and mathematicians who were, in one way or another,
involved with the growing field of information processing. As such, the
SSAA became the cradle of a nascent group of computer professionals. It
also quite successfully strengthened the position of user organizations with
respect to hardware suppliers.70
Initially the computer constituted only a minor break as far as the inter-
action among office machines was concerned. Punched cards and punched
tapes continued to serve as interfaces between computers and other
devices. The Rotterdamsche Bank, for instance, introduced in the early
1960s a system to handle counter transactions by bookkeeping machines
that produced a punched tape. During the night a tape-fed central com-
puter processed all transactions.71 In general, in this period punched cards
and tapes only increased in significance, as they were the main input media
for the first- and second-generation computers.72 Significantly, when IBM
introduced its third-generation 360/40 computer, which was suitable for
both computing and data processing, the company called it a punched-card
installation inside a computer.73 In practice, punched-card departments
were gradually transformed into central computing departments.74 Often
this transformation was accompanied by the integration of departments
that had previously existed alongside each other.75
70. The SSAA was not a commercial consulting firm or a publicly financed nonprofit
organization. During the first ten years its income came mainly from the contributions
of associated companies that pioneered automation. From the end of the 1960s onward,
it was gradually transformed into a training and examination institute that regulated and
controlled the education of the new computer professionals. For the history of the SSAA,
see Ellen van Oost, Nieuwe functies, nieuwe verschillen: Genderprocessen in de constructie
van de nieuwe automatiseringsfuncties 1955–1970 (Delft, 1994), 209–49.
71. Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau (General Dutch Press Association) telex news
message, archive of the Rijkscentrale voor Mechnische Administratie, Apeldoorn, 21
June 1963.
72. The technical development of computers usually is characterized in generations.
The first generation (1953–58) used vacuum tubes as central elements in the processing
unit. The second generation (1958–64) used transistors. Transistorized computers were
smaller and faster than those with vacuum tubes and did not need to be cooled. The
third generation (1964–1972) incorporated the new integrated circuit (IC) technology.
Not only were these machines (again) faster and smaller, but their internal programming
was organized differently. They had a separate operating system, making such new func-
tionalities as timesharing and multitasking possible.
73. Kantoor en Efficiency, September 1968, 4011.
74. Meeuwis, Hulpmiddelen der administratieve techniek (n. 38 above), 6.
75. S. Swaab, Methodiek van de automatische administratie (Alphen aan den Rijn,
1962), 174.
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76. Van Oost, Nieuwe functies, nieuwe verschillen (n. 70 above), 175–97. In general,
the 1950s and 1960s were a period of persistent labor shortage in the Netherlands; Van
Zanden (n. 18 above).
77. In the mid-1960s the R&D department of the governmental Postal, Telegraph
and Telephone Services developed the ALPINO system, a machine that could automati-
cally read and punch numerical information, in an attempt to solve the data-entry prob-
lem at the Dutch Giro Service; Van Oost, Nieuwe functies, nieuwe verschillen, 195. Mark
sensing was successfully used by the Dutch Central Statistical Office for the 1971 census:
Van den Ende, Knopen, kaarten en chips (n. 46 above), 96.
78. Because of labor shortages, the Giro Service, where data processing was still pre-
dominantly done by hand until the end of the 1950s, twice had to stop accepting new
accounts. After the second time, in 1961, management decided to initiate an automation
project. Interestingly, the Giro Service then became one of the leaders in the field of
office automation: Van Oost, Nieuwe functies, nieuwe verschillen, 95–133.
79. Meeuwis, Hulpmiddelen der administratieve techniek, 284.
80. The Giro Service called this “external integration”: G. F. J. A. Groen, “De taaie
ponskaart,” in Een halve eeuw Postcheque- en Girodienst, ed. Hendrik Reinoud et al.
(Utrecht, 1968), 236–42, at 239.
81. Meeuwis, Hulpmiddelen der administratieve techniek (n. 38 above).
Although computers could process large sets of data faster than me-
chanical machines, the technology for producing the data input hardly
changed. This led to an almost insatiable demand for typists, and it was dif-
ficult to staff the noisy punching rooms.76 Several technologies were devel-
oped to automate data entry, not only by computer suppliers like IBM but
also by technical departments in user organizations.77 A relatively simple
innovation was the so-called dual-purpose card, which contained both
handwritten and machine-readable information. Probably the best-known
dual-purpose cards in the Netherlands were remittance forms in the shape
of a punched card; introduced by the Dutch Giro Service in 1961, when the
service began to automate its account administration, these remained in
use until the middle of the 1980s.78 Dual-purpose cards could integrate the
administrations of various actors—companies, banks, account holders, and
clients.79 An energy company, for instance, could send a punched card to a
client, who would then manually fill in the missing information, keep one
part of the card for their records, and then send the card to the Giro Service,
where it would be automatically processed.80
In general, the tendency toward the integration of more tasks into a sin-
gle machine that dated from before the computer era intensified between
1955 and 1980. Experts writing on office technology now explicitly began
to call the new way of working “integrated data processing,” thereby also
retroactively labeling the tendency toward integration in the first half of the
1950s with this term.81 Particularly in third-generation computers, which
possessed timesharing and multitasking capabilities and could be con-
trolled from terminals or consoles, interaction with other office machines,
such as Flexowriters and Justowriters, became largely superfluous. The
computer simply took over the tasks of devices such as addressing ma-
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chines. Remote control and data transfer over telephone lines replaced the
traditional cards and tapes. Multipurpose databases could be used simulta-
neously for different purposes by different departments within the same
organization. In the early 1970s hardware suppliers indeed developed sev-
eral types of remote desktops (keyboard and monitor) to be used for
administrative processes.82 In the second half of the 1970s these remote
workstations began to be equipped with processing units and connected to
electronic typewriters or printers, thus creating the possibility of integrat-
ing data processing and text processing.83 These so-called multiuser sys-
tems were similar in functionality to the personal computers that would
conquer the office desktop in the 1980s.84
The computer continued the trajectory of punched-card machinery in
the office but accelerated the pace of the extension of functional character-
istics. This was particularly true of the third-generation computers that
appeared in the 1960s, which had better systems for handling databases and
possessed time-sharing capabilities. The computer assumed the functions
of several other machines and office technologies, and data transfer
between computers and other devices became far less important. This
meant that some existing interfaces between different office technologies
became superfluous—and were, in fact, incorporated in the design of the
computer.
The Dynamics of the Innovation Junction
This article has attempted to analyze the workings of the office as an
innovation junction at two different but connected levels: at the level of
artifacts, and at the level of emerging and changing relations between pro-
ducers and users of office technology. We argue that the office evolved
through a set of specific interactions between artifacts and actors. The
office that finally came about was partly an unintended consequence of this
process, but also partly the deliberate aim of a number of reflexive actors
pushing for the development of the modern office.
At the level of artifacts, the development and use of one type of office
technology interacted with the development and use of other types. Two
forms of interaction can be distinguished, both of which, in different peri-
ods and in different combinations, occurred in the office. First, two or more
82. Paul Atkinson, “Computer Memories: The History of Computer Form,” History
and Technology 15 (1998): 89–120.
83. Atkinson, 107.
84. The miniaturization that eventually led to minicomputers and personal com-
puters stimulated a break in the centralized organization of data processing. Their rapid
adoption in the 1980s resulted in a wide array of “incompatible, stand-alone machines
and software.” Managers attempting to regain (central) control were partly responsible
for the rise of networked systems; Edwards (n. 68 above), 22.
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technologies could be used in combination. Often this combined use was
accompanied by innovation in one or more technologies or by the creation
of interfaces between one or more technologies. Examples of combined use
include the typewriter with carbon paper and dictaphone and the exten-
sion of the function of the typewriter through the interface of punched
tape. Other examples are the Flexowriter and Justowriter; these had only a
relatively short life before they were made superfluous by the second form
of interaction, the functional integration of the digital computer. Second,
the functional characteristics of technologies could be extended, or the
characteristics of one technology transferred to another, leading to func-
tional integration. Functional integration may refer to different technolo-
gies being used concurrently in one location, one of which takes over func-
tions of human beings or of other technologies, as punched-card machines
took over functions of bookkeeping and text-producing technologies.
Functional integration may also refer to a new technology integrating the
functions of different old ones, as the digital computer in a short period of
time took over functions of various existing devices (punched-card ma-
chines, typewriters, bookkeeping machines, and desk calculators).
Generally speaking, the functional characteristics of an office machine
and technology were at first clearly related to a specific functional domain
inside the office: the production, reproduction, filing, or archiving of doc-
uments, as well as data processing, computing, or communication.
Typewriters, for instance, were intimately linked to the production of let-
ters and other documents, whereas punched-card machines primarily
served data processing tasks. At first, interaction mainly took place between
machines and technologies inside a specific domain, such as document
production, reproduction, and filing. However, interaction increasingly
crossed the borders of the various office activities.
The interaction process between different technologies was accompa-
nied by historical changes in the relations among the actors involved. Four
different actor groups can be distinguished: the producers of office ma-
chines and computer software, which in the Dutch case were almost with-
out exception foreign companies; Dutch importers of office machines and
office machine dealers, who often were represented in one and the same
company; professional groups involved in the introduction and application
of office technology, particularly efficiency engineers and, later on, com-
puter professionals; and the users of office machines. It is important to note
that the third group did not yet exist when the modern office started to
emerge at the end of the nineteenth century. This group later became cru-
cially important in creating a network of offices that are not hierarchically
connected but which evolve interactively.
Based on the interaction processes and the various roles played by
these actors, it is possible to distinguish three phases in the history of the
Dutch office, each characterized by specific types of interaction between
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office machines and actors. In the first phase, one of ad hoc integration,
which lasted from about the 1880s until World War I, several new office
machines were introduced that mechanized only one isolated administra-
tive activity, such as writing or counting. One of these machines, the type-
writer, was at the center of several other technologies applied to the pro-
duction and reproduction of documents. In this period, three groups of
actors were active in the office—producers, importers, and users—but
none was dominant.
During the second period, the era of partial integration, lasting from
about 1914 until about 1955, new kinds of more complex office machines
were introduced. We discussed in particular addressing machines, which
mechanized the process of sending large numbers of letters, and punched-
card machines, which process large volumes of numerical (and, later,
alphabetical) data by sorting and counting. These different types of system
machines, as this new generation of office technologies was called in the
1950s, increasingly combined the mechanization of several administrative
activities—for instance, data processing and printing. Moreover, punched
cards and punched paper tapes served as interfaces between system
machines and a wide range of stand-alone office machines. The introduc-
tion and use of these office technologies often resulted in dramatic changes
in office organization. More than in the previous phase, office managers
had to adapt administrative processes to the machines. Large-scale service
industries created separate departments for processing punched cards.
During this period consultants came to form a new and important profes-
sional group, which pushed unceasingly for integration. They advised on
the organization of the office, including the introduction and implementa-
tion of new technology.
During the period from about 1955 until about 1980, a period of cen-
tralized integration, a transition took place to integrated data processing
and electronic data processing. For some companies, the introduction of
computers for administrative purposes, which in the Netherlands started in
the mid-1950s, was a revolutionary break from the past. For others, com-
puter technology replaced punched-card devices and some other office
machines. Punched cards and tapes remained important in the early part of
the computer age, and in fact became the main input media for computers.
During this phase the position of users and intermediary professional con-
sultants was threatened by hardware producers and their national repre-
sentatives. However, users and their consultants were able to regain inde-
pendence through the creation of new platforms for knowledge transfer,
such as the Study Center for Administrative Automation.
Of course, further research is needed to determine whether this phase
model is specific to the history of the Dutch office or can be generalized. It
also remains to be seen whether and to what extent the model is appropriate
to the study of other innovation junctions, such as factories and households.
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Based on the history of the Dutch office, this article has tried to demon-
strate that the dynamics of technological development in innovation junc-
tions are different from those operating in large technical systems. Devel-
opments at innovation junctions do not follow a trajectory of invention,
development and innovation, transfer, growth, and momentum. Rather,
this case showed a process of ad hoc, partial, and centralized integration.
Further, the change dynamics at innovation junctions are mainly domi-
nated by interaction processes among users, various kinds of intermediate
actors, and producers, including importers. It is not possible to identify sys-
tem builders, although intermediate actors, such as efficiency engineers and
management consultants, were important in identifying needs and oppor-
tunities for integration. Mechanisms such as load factors, economic mix,
and reverse salients are not easily applied to the study of technical change
at innovation junctions. Instead, a driving force must be located in the sys-
tematic effort to combine and connect various kinds of office machines.
This effort has been provoked and reinforced by the continuing process of
introduction of more machines at a bounded space, the collocation of var-
ious technologies, and the emergence of a new ideal of systemization and
rationalization leading to the ideal of the rational office.
